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A major shift in Chapter 11 practice in the past decade has been 
the emergence of hedge funds that specialize in investing in 
distressed debt. Their presence in the reorganization of large firms is 
pervasive; in 2009 and 2010, they invested in more than 70% of the 
Chapter 11 cases of large firms. Distressed hedge funds wield more 
than $100 billion in capital and aim to use their expertise in the 
bankruptcy process to profit from investing in the claims of large 
distressed firms. Towards that end, they deploy both activist and 
passive investing strategies. While recent research has shed some 
light on the impact of these funds on the bankruptcy process, much 
remains unknown. 
 
Background on Junior Investors in Bankruptcy 
 
Take, for example, one of the most important activist investing 
strategies: buying lower-priority claims like unsecured debt and 
equity and hiring lawyers to participate in the bankruptcy process. I 
refer to this strategy as “junior activism.” Junior activists are well-
known for their willingness to challenge managers and senior 
creditors in the board room and the court room. Like activist 
investing more generally, junior activism is a source of controversy. 
Critics view junior activists as opportunists that file meritless 
motions and objections to extract hold-up value settlements. To 
quote Wilbur Ross in his testimony to the American Bankruptcy 
Institute’s Reform Commission, “[junior creditors] know that 
terrorist [litigation] tactics can lead to concessions from 
economically superior claimants and that even when they don’t, 
litigation sometimes results in decisions that bestow value on the 
nominally lower ranking class.”2 In theory, this frivolous litigation is 
                                                 
1. Summarized and excerpted from Jared Ellias, Do Activist 
Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard in Chapter 11?, 8 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 493 (2016). 
2. Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to 
Study Reform of Chapter 11 at 3 (2013). 
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also thought to increase bankruptcy costs, undermining the Chapter 
11 policy goal of maximizing creditor recoveries. 
Junior activists, however, believe they counter the perverse 
incentives of managers of Chapter 11 debtors. Chapter 11 leaves 
managers in control of the bankruptcy process and requires them to 
maximize creditor recoveries. In performing this duty, managers face 
what economists call a “moral hazard.” If the firm is reorganized in a 
transaction that is appraised at a discount to the firm’s true value, 
managers and senior creditors can profit at the expense of junior 
claimants by extracting value that otherwise might go to junior 
constituencies. Junior activists claim they intervene to stop managers 
and senior creditors from exploiting their control over the bankruptcy 
process to enrich themselves at the expense of junior claimants.  
 
Empirical Study and Findings 
 
Which of these views of junior activism is accurate? I attempted 
to answer that question using a hand-collected dataset of 107 large 
firms that filed for Chapter 11 in 2009 and 2010. To measure junior 
activism, I developed a methodology that I refer to as a “litigation 
score.” My intuition was to treat the observable portions of junior 
activism—the litigation, their court victories, and the identity of 
junior activists—as a proxy for things not reliably observable, such 
as out-of-court negotiations. The more litigation—objections to the 
debtor’s key motions, requests for judicial relief like motions to 
appoint trustees and examiner—the higher the score. This 
methodology allowed me to distinguish the cases in which junior 
activists were relatively more active from the ones in which they 
appeared to play less of a role. 
My findings are consistent with the view that junior activists play 
an important role in corporate governance that is consistent with 
bankruptcy’s policy goals. First, the evidence suggests that junior-
activist litigation is associated with an increase in the appraised value 
of the restructuring transaction. This supports the view that junior 
activists improve Chapter 11. Depending on the facts of the case, the 
junior activist might have increased the appraised transaction value 
by pushing a reluctant management team into a transaction that 
maximized the true value of the firm. Alternatively, the junior 
activist might have prevented management and senior lenders from 
obtaining an artificially low appraisal from their investment banker. 
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Additionally, I examine the market prices of senior claims at the end 
of the bankruptcy process and find no evidence that the observed 
increase in the appraisal results in the firm being overvalued or 
senior creditors undercompensated. 
Second, for a subset of the sample, I was able to calculate the 
market value of the firm’s outstanding debt and equity on the date the 
firm filed for bankruptcy. This allowed me to control for the market’s 
recovery expectations at the beginning of the bankruptcy process. I 
found that, controlling for changes in credit market conditions and 
other important variables, junior activism appears to be positively 
correlated with higher creditor recoveries than the market anticipated 
prior to the bankruptcy process. This suggests that junior activists 
are, at the least, savvy investors. It also provides support for the view 
that they contribute expertise that improves the outcome of the 
bankruptcy process. 
Third, by analyzing bond and loan returns around key 
bankruptcy hearings, I found a positive relationship between post-
hearing returns for junior claimholders and the presence of a junior 
activist. This correlation appears to be driven by the junior activist’s 
prosecution of objection to management’s motions. While I do not 
observe all of the data I would need to come to firm conclusions, the 
observed increase in the value of the junior claim does not appear to 
be a transfer from senior creditors. This finding, too, is consistent 
with the notion that junior activists play a crucial governance role 
that checks management’s powers as debtor-in-possession at 
important points in the bankruptcy process. 
Fourth, by examining the range of estimated value by firms that 
recapitalized with supporting investment-banker appraisals, I found 
that the range appears to be narrower for the cases with junior-
activist involvement. This is consistent with the notion that junior 
activists contribute expertise that reduces the randomness of the 
appraisal process and, together with the evidence of higher 
appraisals, is broadly consistent with the expectation that junior 
activists positively influenced the governance of bankrupt firms by 
constraining opportunistic underappraisal. 
Still, some evidence was consistent with the predictions of the 
critics of junior activism. I observed payments outside of the absolute 
priority rule in 27% of sample cases. However, the value distributed 
outside of the absolute priority rule was relatively small—generally 
ranging between 1% and 3% of the appraised transaction value. It 
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seems unlikely that these small settlements would make the 
investment that junior activists make in lawyer and investment-
banker fees profitable, suggesting that hedge funds would be unlikely 
to litigate opportunistically in search of these small observed 
payments. 
The evidence also linked junior-activist litigation to higher 
attorneys’ fees. This makes intuitive sense. After all, if junior 
activists are filing objections, the debtor’s attorneys will incur 
additional fees in responding to them and preparing for trial. 
However, the magnitude of the implied cost increase is relatively 
low, and direct bankruptcy costs themselves are a mere 1.3% of the 
appraised value of the median sample case. I did not observe a 
relationship between junior activism and the length of the bankruptcy 
case, which is inconsistent with the worry of critics that overly 




The results in the study offer some support both to the claims of 
junior activists and to the claims of their detractors. On the whole, 
however, the findings are inconsistent with the claim that activist 
investors abuse the bankruptcy system by extracting hold-up 
payments. I did not find evidence of large payments outside of the 
absolute priority rule, and junior activists appear to focus their efforts 
on relatively more valuable cases, inconsistent with the expectation 
of indiscriminate litigation. Moreover, I found evidence suggesting 
that junior activism is correlated with unexpectedly high creditor 
recoveries and other corroborating evidence that support the view 
that junior activists contribute expertise to bankruptcy cases that lead 
to better outcomes.  
However, it is important to qualify these results by noting that 
my methodology cannot eliminate the possibility that the observed 
positive correlation between junior activism and the final appraisal is 
better explained as nonrandom and savvy selection of target firms by 
sophisticated investors. It does seem unlikely that junior activists 
would correctly identify undervalued firms and then reduce their 
returns by the millions of dollars they spend on lawyers and 
investment bankers to participate in the process, but my results 
cannot conclusively reject this possibility. Nonetheless, I do think 
that the results shift the burden of proof onto the critics of junior 
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activism to show that there is a problem with overly litigious hedge 
funds abusing the bankruptcy system. Further research is needed to 
learn more about the impact hedge funds might have on the 
bankruptcy process, but the results in this study cautiously suggest 
that junior-activist investing strategies might be, on average, 
beneficial. 
